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474 URNALES t1. WIGGER [35C.2d 
[L. A. No. 21336. In Bank. May 23, 1950.] 
LOUISE ORNALES, Appellant, v. MYRTLE E. WIGGER, 
Respondent. 
[1] Trial-Instructions-Requests-NecessitJ for.-While an ap-
tlellant may not ordinarily complain of tho lack of an instruc-
tion without first having made a request tl:.at the charge be 
made more specific or having asked for qualifying instruc-
tions, he may complain, in the absence of such request, where 
the instruction given erroneously states the applicable law and 
prejudice is suffered thereby. 
[2] Negligence-Instructions-Violation of Statute.-In an action 
for personal injuries sustained by a pedestrian who was struck 
by an automobile at night while she was crossing a street 
within a marked crosswalk, an instruction that proof that one 
of the parties violated one or more sections of the Vehicle 
Code raised only a rebuttable presumption that he or she was 
negligent, and that such presumption might be overcome by 
evidence showing that under all of the surrounding circum-
stances the conduct in question was excusable or justifiable, 
should have been qualified by an instruction on the type of 
evidence necessary to rebut the presumption of negligence, 
but the trial court was not required of its own motion to give 
such special instruction in the absence of a request therefor I..y 
counsel. 
[3] Id.-Instructions-Violation of Statute.-In an action for per-
sonal injuries sustained by a pedestrian who was struck by an 
automobile at night while she was crossing a street within a 
marked crosswalk, evidence that the wind was blowing, that 
it was raining, that plaintiff was dressed in dark clothing and 
was carrying a black parasol or umbrella, and that defendant 
did not see plaintiff prior to the accident, but only saw 
a black parasol going by the left-hand window of the car and 
then heard a scream, could be considered by the jury to rebut 
the presumption of negligence arising from defendant's viola-
tion of a statute, and under the circumstances an instruction 
that such a presumption could be rebutted by evidence showing 
that the violator's conduct was justifiable or excnsable cor-
rectly stated the law. 
[4] Automobiles - Instructions-Contributory Negligence.-In an 
action for personal injuries sustained by a pedestrian who was 
[1] See 24 Cal.Jur. 796. 
[2] See 19 Cal • .iur. 632; 38 Am.Jur. 823. 
Mclt. Dig: References: [1,5] Trial, § 136; (2, 8] Negligence, 
1194; [4] Automobiles, 1348(1). 
May 1950] ORNALES t.!. WIGGER 
(35 C.2d 414; 218 P.2d 5311 
47~ 
struck by an automobile at night while she was crossing a 
streenvithin a marked crosswalk, it could not be said that the 
court over-instructed the jury on the . issue of contributory 
negligence where it appeared that the man of the house to 
which plaintiff was carried after the accident testified that 
plaintiff's breath was very strong of liqnor; defendant also 
testified that plaintiff had said, "I didn't see you. 1 had the 
parasol down in front of me coming across the street"; and de-
fendant's husband testi1l.ed that on the next day he noticed 
that the stem of the rear view mirror, which was fastened OD 
the front frame of the left door of the ear, was bent, since it 
could be inferred from this evidence that plaintiff walked into 
the side of defendant's ear. 
Trial-Instructions-Requests-Necessit7 for.-Ina personal 
injury action, plaintiff could not successfully complain that 
the trial court's failure to instruct the jury properly on the 
meaning and effect of certain impeaching evidence was preju-
dicial error, where it was Dot shown that plaintiff's attorney 
requested, aDd was refused, such an instruction. 
" APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
t,A.UI§~""CD County. Harry R. Archbald, Judge. Affirmed. 
. Action for damages for personal injuries sustained by a 
~'tMMlestrilan in an automobile accident. Judgment for defend-
atHrmed. 
Karena, Rabwin & Nash and Robert M. Newell·for Ap-
EBallider. Gilbert, Kelly, Thompson & Veatch and Patrick H. 
for Respondent. 
J .-Plaintiff sued for damages for personal in-
II11At.Ai,nM by her as the result of an accident which 
Plilo.~n .. _it at about 6 :30 p. m. on December 24, 1946, at the 
D1terlilectlon of Main and Workman Streets in the city of Los 
IIJ,lge,les. Main Street runs from north to south, is 50 feet 
-and has streetcar tracks on either side of the single 
line. Workman Street intersects with Main, runs east 
and is 35 feet in width. At night, the interSection 
;il!lllDliinated by a double street light at the northwest cor-
single street lights on the southeast and southwest 
There are marked crosswalks at the intersection for 
Qestrillll use . 
. raining on the night of the accident, aad plaintitf, 
) 
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Louise Ornales, who was dressed in black and who was carry· 
ing an umurella. was proceeding toward a grocery store on 
the northwest comer of the IOtersectiOIl. At the time there 
was little or no vehicular traffic on Main Street, and Mrs. 
Ornales was walking approximately in thl' center of the north· 
erly marked crosswalk and was about three-fourths of the 
way across the street wben the accident occurred. Mrs. Or· 
nales testified that she looked in both directions before she 
started to cross the street and that she looked again just 
after she crossed the center line. She had taken two or three 
additionaJ steps when she was struck by, or walked into, an 
automobile driven by defendant, Myrtle E. Wigger. Mrs. 
Wigger, accompanied by her husband, was driving a 1931 
Ford sedan in a southerly direction on Main Street at a 
speed of about 15 or 20 miles an hour. The ligbts of the car 
were on low beam. At the time of the accident the car was 
about balf way between the streetcar tracks west of the center 
line and the western curb of Main Street. The defendant, 
Mrs. Wigger, testified that she did not see Mrs. Ornales prior 
to the accident and that all she bad seen was a black parasol 
going by the left-hand window of the car and that she had 
heard a scream. After the accident, Mrs Ornales was lying in 
the marked crosswalk close to its southern boundary. Mr. and 
Mrs. Wigger and a neighbor boy carried the injured woman 
to the porch of a nearby house where the Wiggers unsuccess-
fully tried to obtain an ambulance by telephone. Finally, 
the Wiggers drove Mrs. Ornales to the General Hospital where 
it was ascertained that she bad received a fracture of the 
skull, a 2-inch cut on her right temple, severe bruises on 
her right elbow and knee, and other injuries. 
During the trial before.ajury, plaintift"s motion for 8 di-
rected verdict was denied. The jury returned 8 verdict for 
defendant, and plaintift' then made a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, both of which 
were denied by the court. Plaintiff's appeal is basad on the 
following contentions: (1) That the instruction given by the 
court on the effect of 8 violation of section 560(a) of the 
Vehicle Code was prejudicial error; and (2) that the court 
over-instructed the jury with respect to contributory negli-
gence; and (3) that the trial court's failure to instruct the 
jury properly on the meaning and effect of certain impeach-
ing evidence was prejudicial error. 
Section 560 (8) of the Vehicle Code provides that "The 
driver of 8 vehicle shall yield the right of way to a pedestrian 
) 
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crossing the roadway within any marked crosswalk or within 
any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, except as other-
wise provided in this chapter." (No exception is here in-
. volved.) 
The instruction given by the trial court is as follows: 
., Even though you may find in this case from a prepon-
n"'~H.'''''' of the evidence that one of the parties violated one 
more sectiollli of the Vehicle Code of the State of California, 
are instructed that the proof of such violation raises only 
rebuttable presumption that he or she was negligent, and 
such presumption is not conclusive and may be overcome 
other evidence showing that under all of the circumstances 
. the event the conduct in question was excusable, 
.Iw;:' ........ u .. , and such as might reasonably be expected from a 
_~'.~_.___ of ordinary prudence. In this connection you may 
&:jUIJIllm.e that a person of ordinary prudence will reasonably 
to obey the law and will do so unless causes not of his 
intended making induce him without moral fault to do 
". 'You are further instructed that a violation of law is of 
consequence in this action unless it was the proximate 
of, or contributed in some degree as the proximate 
~aw;e of, injuries found by you to have been suffered by the 
.. ' is plaintiff's contention that there was no evidence in 
. record to justify the portion of the instruction which per-
. 'the jury to determine that defendant's violation of 
'code section was excusable or justifiable under the holding 
majority in Satterlee'v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 
. 581 [177 P.2d 279]. It is plaintiff's position that the 
". should have been instructed that defendant was negligent 
'matter of law. 
'the Satterlee case it was held that .. An act which is 
~.'U".UI."'U in violation of an ordinance or statute is presump-
"Y.I-II'''IV an act of negligence, but the presumption is not con-
IIil'1:ta'i~ .. and may be rebutted by showing that the act was justi-
excusable under the circumstances. Until so re-
'it is conclusive. (Citing cases.] However, the fact 
excuse the violation of a statute has been defined 
as one resulting' from causes or things beyond the 
:of the person charged with the violation'. [Citing 
. (Satferlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., supra, 
. _ And, .on page 590: "In the application of this rule 
VIOlation of a statutory requirement must be considered 
) 
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in connection with the surrounding circumstances. Ordinarily, 
the excuse relied upon by the violator presents a question of 
fact for the jury's determiJJ.ation. As stated in Scalf v. 
Eicher, supra, p. 54 [11 Cal.App.2d 44 (53 P.2d 368) J : 
'Whether or not a violation of a statute or ordinance proxi-
mately contributed to an accident and whether the violation 
was excusable or justifiable are questions of fact except in a 
case where ". . . the court is impelled to say that from the 
facts reasonable men can draw but one inference and that an 
inference pointing unerringly to the negligence of the plain-
tiff contributing to his injury." , " 
A search· of the record reveals that the only instruction re-
. quested by the plaintiff with reference to section 560(a) of the 
Vehicle Code was the section itself. This was given, as re-
quested, by the trial court. [1] Ordinarily, before an ap-
pellant may complain of the' lack of an instruction, he must 
have made a request that the charge be made more specific, 
or ask for qualifying instructions. .This general rule is ap-
parently qualified by the rule that an appellant may com-
plain, in the absence of such request, where the instruction 
given erroneously states the applicable law and prejudice is 
suffered thereby. (Lane v. Pacific Greyhound Linel, 26 Cal. 
2d 575, 587 [160 P.2d 21] ; Tabata v. Murane, 24 Cal.2d 221 
[148 P.2d 605] ; Colgrove v. Lompoc etc. Club, 51 Cal.App.2d 
18 [124 P.~d 128].) The instruction given differs very slightly 
from Instruction 149 (BAJI) which reads as follows: "Con-
duct which is in violation of (applicable code section) just 
read to you constitutes negligence per se. This means that if 
the evidence supports a finding, and you do find, that a per-
son did so conduct himself, it requires a presumption that he 
'~'-'--'---""--"'-"(or){she) was negligent. I However, such presumption is not 
conclusive. It may be overcome by other evidence showing 
that under all the circumstances surrounding the event, the 
conduct in question was excusable, justifiable and such as 
might reasonably have been expected from a person of ordi-
nary. prudence. In this connection, you may assume that a 
person of ordinary prudence will reasonably endeavor to obey 
the law and will do so unless causes, not of his own intended 
making, induce him, without moral fault to do otherwise." 
This instruction (149, BAJI) was approved by this court in 
Combs v. Los Angeles Railway Corp., 29 Cal.2d 606, 610 
[177 P.2d 293]. In the instant case an instruction was given 
defining a presumption: "A presumption is a deduction which 
the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts. 
\ 
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Unless declared by law to be conclusive, it may be contro-
verted by other evidence, direct or indirect; but unless so 
controverted the jury is bound to find in accordance with the 
presumption. " 
[2] Undoubtedly the instruction given on the effect of a 
violation of a statute should have been qualified by an instruc-
tion on the type of evidence necessary to rebut the presump-
. tion of negligence. In the Satterlee case it is said that ". . . 
the fact which will excuse the violation of a statute has been 
'defined by the court as one resulting 'from causes or things 
fbeyond the control of the person charged with the violation.' " 
fTbe trial court need not of its own motion give special in-
~8tructions in the absence of a request therefor by counsel. 
f'(Comstock v. Morse, 107 Cal.App. 71 [290 P. 108] ; Crooks v. 
l.White, 107 Cal.App. 304 [290 P. 4971; Sherman v. Kirk-
~j>~trick, 83 Cal.App. 307 [256 P. 570].) In Baldridge v. Cun-
ffs1ngham, 31 Cal.App.2d 128, 132 [87 P.2d 369], where the 
P"Vioiation of certain provisions of the Vehicle Code was in-
it was said" If defendant Cunningham desired a fur-
elaboration upon the instruction relative to the quantum 
evidence necessary to establish justification or excuse, and 
~flI'P."E!hv rebut the presumption of negligence arising from a 
R~:olBltioln of the California Vehicle Code, it was her duty to 
Imll'01l0Se the further instruction which she desired and request 
to give it. This she did not do. (Mau8 v. Scavenger 
"O'I~cft'!Je Assn., 2 Cal.App.2d 624, 629 [39 P.2d 209].)" 
also, James v. Myerf' 68 Cal.App.2d 23 [156 P.2d 69], 
cases there cited.) 
however, requested no qualifying instruction 
type of evidence necessary to rebut the presump-
. negligence. Defendant maintains that "if there was 
--.~"tY'''P''·' ,.,. in submitting the issue of negligence to the jury, 
invited the error by requesting other instructions on 
issue, and is not in a position to complain thereof." 
"' .. I .... , .... from the record that plaintiff invited the court 
the issue of negligence to the jury in some 15 sepa-
! I#structions, 10 of which were given. As we have previ-
pointed out, none of these instructions touched on the 
of the violation of such a statute as the one under con-
~l'ati,on, or upon the type of evidence necessary to excnse 
Ji,'iI'inl'An"n of such a statute. 
ue:ren0811t testified that she did not see plaintiff, that 
'\vas entering Workman Street" I saw a parasol go up 
at my window, at the left, and heard a woman 1Cl'e&m 
) 
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and I looked; I didn't see anybody so I knew there was noth-
ing in front of me and I was already in the cross street so 
I was going to stop . . ." The record shows that the wind 
was blowing on the night of the accident and that it was rain· 
ing. This atmospheric condition, together with the fact that 
plaintiff was dressed in dark clothing and was carrying a 
black parasol or umbrella could be considered by the jury as 
evidence to rebut the presumption of negligence arising from 
defendant's violation of the statute. Certainly, the weather, 
the darkness and plaintiff's attire were all matters beyond 
the control of defendant. It was held in the Satterlee case 
that "the issue as to whether the circumstances were such as 
to excuse violation" should be left to the trier of the fact. 
It would seem that, under the circumstances of this case, the 
instruction correctly stated the law. (Mathers v. Oounty of 
Riverside, 22 Ca1.2d 781 [141 P.2d 419J ; Fennessey v~ Pacific 
Gas & Elec. 00., 20 Cal.2d 141 [124 P.2d 51] ; Johnson v. 
Griffith, 19 Cal.2d 176 [120 P.2d 6]; Fiefz v. Hubbard, 59 
Cal.App.2d 124 [138 P.2d 315] ; Prescott v. Oity of Orange, 
56 Cal.App.2d 144 [132 P.2d 523] ; Finney v. Wierman, 52 
CaLApp.2d 282 [126 P.2d 143J ; Henslee v. Fox, 25 Cal.App. 
2d 286 [77 P.2d 307]; Rath v. Bankston, 101 Cal.App. 274 
[281 P. 1081].) 
[4] Plaintiff cites no authority for her contention that the 
jury was over-instructed on the issue of contributory negli-
gence. The same point has been raised in other cases where 
it was held that reversible error was not shown since the 
instructions did not state the law incorrectly. (Muskin v. 
Gerun,46 Cal.App.2d 404 [116 P.2d 105] ; O'Brien v. Edens, 
121LCal.App.l00 [13 P_2d 754]; Estate of Keithley, 134 
Cal. 9 [66 P. 5].) The record shows that there is evidence 
which warranted an instruction on contributory negligence. 
Mrs. Wigger, the defendant, testified that the plaintUf'. 
breath was very strong of liquor. Although this was denied 
by plaintUf, Mr. Trujillo testified to .the same effect. Mrs. 
Wigger also testified that Mrs .. Omales had said "Well, it is 
no more your fault that mine, I didn't see you. I had the 
parasol down in front of me coming across the street." This 
was emphatically denied by the plaintUf. Mr. Wigger testi-
fied that the next. day he noticed that the stem of the rear 
view mirror, which was fastened on the front frame of the 
left door of the car, was bent. From this evidence it could 
be inferred that plaintiff walked into the side of defendant'. 
car a:n.d received her injuries in that way. 
) 
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:: [5] The neighbor boy, Hector Barrere, plaintiff's witness, 
,'testified that he was about 50 feet from the scene of the accident 
;'when he heard a bump; that he walked to the intersection 
and helped Mr. Wigger carry the injured woman to the porch 
. "of a house nearby. He testified that the owners of the house, 
;'. Mr. and Mrs. Trujillo, were there. Defendant's attorney 
, asked the witness (Barrere) if he had talked with Mrs. Tru-
;.)ruo. "A. No, 1 didn't talk to her but 1 know her good; 
: I didn't talk to her. Q .... Did you tell Mrs. Trujillo that 
, Mrs. Ornales walked into the side of a car'" This was objected 
:to as hearsay and defendant's attorney stated that he was 
" laying a foundation for impe,achment. At this point, counsel 
',' approached the bench and a conference was had outside the 
" bearing of the jury. The court then stated that "I am ad-
'mitting this for the purpose of impeachment if it is so." 
": Plaintiff contends that at the conference before the bench, she 
'requested that the jury be instrueted that the evidence was 
~~merely for the purpose of impeachment and that it could not 
"be used for probative purposes. Mrs. Trujillo testified that 
<'Hector had told her that Mrs. Ornales walked into the side 'of defendant's car. During this testimony, plaintiff's attor-
:ney asked the court to instruct the jury that the evidence 
; ivas admissible only for the purpose of impeaching plaintiff's 
witness, Hector Barrere. Mr. Newell (plaintiff's attorney) : 
>\'jl want to be sure it (impeachment purposes) is understood 
"b the jury. THE COURT: That is true." There is nothing 
ill the, record, other than the testimony cited, to show that 
plaintiff's attorney requested, and was refused, such an in-
.,atruction. It would seem, again, that before an appellant 
~ay complain of such lack of instruction, he must show that 
1iehnade'SUch request. (See cases cited supra.) 
('1:'he evidence in this casel is in direct conflict, with the 
;;t;iception of the fact that Mrs. Ornales was lying in the marked 
, . alk at the intersection of the two streets after the 
[) ideot. Under the well established rule the resolution of 
~ch conflict is for the trier of the fact. 
{j, 
'~The judgment is affirmed . 
. Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schaliler, J., and 
,pence, J., concurred. 
\;TRAYNOR, J.-My views with respect to the instruction 
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in Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Ca1.2d 581, 593. 
601 [177 P.2d 279], and in a dissenting opinion in Combs v. 
Los Angeles Railway Corp., 29 Cal.2d 606, 613·615 [177 P.2(1 
293] . These views remain unchanged, but since the trial 
court must instruct the jury in conformity with the majority 
opinions in those cases. I concur in the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 22 
1950. ' 
rSac. No. 6099. In Bank. May 26. 1950.] 
ORLIE GOGUE, Appellant, v. EUGENE W. MAcDONALD, 
Respondent. 
[1] Innkeepers - Defrauding Innkeepers. - A criminal complaint 
failed to allege a violation of Pen. Code, § 537, making it a 
crime to defraud an innkeeper, where the facts alleged ShOWM 
that the person accused of the crime had removed himself Ilod 
his belongings from the prosecuting witness' cottage witHout 
paying rent, since the code section refers to removal of belong. 
ings without payment of rent for certain furnished accommo-
dations . 
[2] False Imprisonment - Oomplaint. - Where a complaint for 
wrongful arrest and detention alleged that defendant COM-
plained to a justice of the peace that plaintiff removed himself 
.and his belongings from defendant's cottage without paying 
rent, and procured such officer to issue a warrant of arrest 
based on an alleged violation of Pen. Code, § 537, but failed to 
allege bad faith, such as wilful falsity or malice, in defendant'. 
statement of the facts to the justice of the peace, the truth of 
the facts so stated and the absence of bad faith in stating them 
will be assumed. 
[3.1 Id.-Remedies.-Unlawful interference with the personal lib. 
erty of another, within the purview of Pen. Code, § 236, (\('lIn· 
ing false imprisonment. affords a civil right of action for the 
recovery of damages. 
[1] See 14 Oal.Jur. 328: 28 Am.Jur. 648. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Innkeepers, § 8; [2] False ImpriKon. 
ment, § 16; [3] False Imprisonment, § 14; [4] Malicious Pro!wmt. 
tion, § 1; [5] Malicious Prosecution, § 11; (6] False Imprison-
ment, § 8. 
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